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Abstract: -  We show that information sharing among banks may serve as a collusive device. An
informational sharing agreement is an a-priori commitment to reduce informational asymmetry
between banks in future lending. Hence, information sharing agreements tend to increase the
intensity of competition in future periods and, thus, reduce the value of informational rents in
current competition. We contribute to the existing literature by emphasizing that a reduction in
informational rents will also reduce the intensity of competition in the current period, thereby
reducing competitive pressure in current credit markets. We provide a large class of economic
environments, where a ban on information sharing is strictly preferred by society.
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1.  Introduction
Credit bureaus and credit registers play an important role in communicating credit histories of
borrowers to lenders, and, thus, as is widely asserted, contribute to more efficiency in credit
markets. Recent contributions in the literature have substantiated this view by presenting models
with socially beneficial implications of information sharing (Japelli and  Pagano (1999), Pagano
and Japelli (1993), as well as  Pagano and Padilla (1997), (1999).  While this literature is largely
concerned with the cost of lending it raises remarkably little concern about potential anti-
competitive implications of information exchange among lenders.
To the extent that information exchange coordinates informational asymmetries in the future it
tends to separate strategic concerns about future lending from current lending decisions. We
show that this property may significantly reduce the intensity of competition in the present
lending markets. Without information sharing the prospective of future informational rents on the
existing clientele will enhance current competition among lenders.
The intertemporal collusion-enhancing effect of information sharing resembles the mechanism
presented by Petersen and Rajan (1995), who argue that the bank’s willingness to lend in the
initial stage of a dynamic banking relationship increases with the concentration of the lending
market. Petersen and Rajan demonstrate that credit market competition imposes constraints on
the ability of borrowers and lenders to intertemporally share the surplus from investment projects
so that lenders in a more competitive lending market may be forced to initially charge higher
interest rates than lenders with more market power. However, issues related to information
exchange between lenders are completely outside their analysis.
Virtually all the recent literature on information exhange in credit markets stresses the value of
communication among lenders in reducing default probabilities of borrowers in situations of
limited strategic interaction among lenders. We show that the supposedly beneficial
consequences of information sharing are a consequence of the lack of potential competition in
those models. Typically in this literature, informational advantages are arbitrarily assigned at the
beginning of the lending market. By enriching the market structure to allow for potential local
interaction of rival lenders in each period, we show that information sharing should rather be3
viewed as a collusive device since it reduces the competitiveness of current lending markets
drastically. We provide a model in which the gain from future competitiveness are more than
compensated by the losses of current competitiveness independently of the time preferences held
by borrowers and lenders in the credit market.
1
Pagano and Padilla (1997), in particular, demonstrate that information sharing may render credit
markets viable, which are not in its absence. They show this result in a two-period model, in
which banks are information monopolists in both periods. Banks observe the true risk classes of
their clientele but not those of their competitors`. Hence, in the absence of information sharing
banks can extract all the surplus from borrowers, thus reducing the incentives for entrepreneurs to
invest in project-specific and ability-enhancing technologies that increase repayment
probabilities. Binding ex ante agreements to share information at the end of period 1 commit the
banks to compete in the credit market in stage 2 under conditions of symmetric information.  This
implies a commitment to more effective competition and, thus, to share period-2 surplus with the
entrepreneurs. Accordingly, information sharing will increase the incentives into development of
entrepreneurial ability and thereby the repayment probabilities. In particular, Pagano and Padilla
prove that credit markets may operate under a regime of information sharing, which would
collapse without communication.
We show that this argument collapses when lenders are symmetrically informed initially. Like
Pagano and Padilla we consider constellations in which banks will become informational
monopolists at stage 2. However, contrary to their framework, we allow banks to compete for
clients in period 1. In this situation the prospect of future rents intensifies competition in period 1.
Using the standard Hotelling framework we find that lenders` overall profits are highest if they
can commit to share information. At the same time entrepreneurial incentives to reduce
repayment probabilities are lowest under information sharing. Hence, we interpret information
sharing in credit markets as a potentially collusive device. Policy implications should be drawn
quite carefully with respect to the nature of the strategic environment.
                                                       
1  Discount factors are assumed identical across borrowers and lenders.4
Finally, our analysis is related to a large body of literature on information sharing.
2 Prominent
examples of this literature include Shapiro (1986) and Gal-Or (1985, 1986), which focus on the
incentives for oligopolists to exchange private information concerning common market
conditions or firm-specific efficiency. These models are two-stage games of the following
character. Prior to the actual observation of the private information the firms have to make
binding commitments whether to reveal their private information or to keep it private. At the
second stage market competition (based on Cournot and Bertrand competition) takes place. This
literature generally finds that the direction of the ex ante incentives for information exchange
depends on the nature of market competition (Bertrand or Cournot) and on the type of uncertainty
(uncertainty concerning common demand conditions or firm-specific costs). This literature tends
to agree, however, that information sharing increases social surplus in most cases. Hence,
concerns about collusive conduct by information sharing agreements are not supported in those
economic environments.
The model of a banking duopoly is introduced in section 2. Section 3 presents the subgame
perfect equilibrium. The role of information sharing is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents
further comments and section 6 concludes. Most of the technical details and the mathematical
proofs are delegated to the Appendix.
2.  Spatial Banking Duopoly
Consider a  market with two lenders, which we henceforth label banks A and B. They are situated
at the end points of a Hotelling line segment [0,1]. Borrowers, or entrepreneurs, are uniformly
distributed on this line. They incur proportional travel costs of t  per unit distance traveled. Their
addresses are private information.
3 Since entrepreneurs are lacking any funds of their own they
need to apply for external finance at one of the two banks. All agents are assumed to be risk-
neutral.
                                                       
2  See Raith (1996) for a comprehensive survey.
3  This model can be interpreted straightforwardly in the geographical sense. For most purposes, however, the
location on the line could be interpreted as some other unobserved characteristic that affects lenders choice between
banks.5
Entrepreneurs are of two types, and both types are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line.
Only talented entrepreneurs can generate positive cash flows. They have access to a project that
yields a cash flow of  v  with probability p  and  0  with  p - 1 . Untalented entrepreneurs never
generate any cash-flow but derive positive utility from controlling a project.
4 The proportion of
talented entrepreneurs is  1 0 < < m .
Projects can be repeated sequentially. In this case the returns are conditionally independent from
one period to another. Moreover, talented entrepreneurs can strategically select the success
probability p  of their venture by some private investment at the stage prior to the market phase
at a cost  ) (p C , which is increasing and convex in p .
Banks initially have no specific information about borrowers` types and addresses. They only
know the general pool characteristics. In period 1 they compete for lenders by announcing
lending rates 
i R1 . At the end of the period they observe their borrowers´ types, and whether each
of these borrowers was successful or not. This information is private information of the bank and
may be communicated under an information sharing regime. Without information sharing
however,  competition at stage 2 takes place under conditions of asymmetric information across
banks. Accordingly, banks will charge different prices to clients with different histories and
announce lending rates  ) , ( 2 2
i i R R
￿
 for existing lenders and new lenders respectively. While in
general banks may also wish to discriminate between successful and unsuccessful borrowers, we
will consider only such situations, where successful lenders can finance the second period
projects entirely out of their period 1 cash-flow, and, hence, do not require second period finance.
In summary, the market extends over three periods. Initially, at the investment stage, period 0,
entrepreneurs engage in specific investments that will affect repayment probabilities p  in both
periods 1 and 2. The credit market opens twice. In period 1 banks compete for lenders by
announcing lending rates 
i R1 . At stage 2 banks announce lending rates  ) , ( 2 2
i i R R
￿
 and at the end of
the period  cash-flows are realized and the market winds down.
                                                       
4  Hence, under limited liability, they will undertake projects even when they expect insolveny with certainty.6
We will assume that entrepreneurs are protected under limited liability. Moreover, banks period-
end information is verifiable and thus can be used to enforce the contractual arrangements
immediately.
In order to simplify the analysis we assume that in case of success entrepreneurs generate
sufficient cash-flow for repayment of the period 1 loan and for funding the period 2 project.
Hence, we assume that v is sufficiently large.
5
Finally, we will assume that the intensity of competition in the banking sector is high enough
such that in period 2 uninformed banks will not try to compete for their rival’s clientele.
6 When
t  is low enough, uninformed banks cannot compensate the risk of erroneously funding
untalented clients of their rival and opt to withdraw from that market altogether as shown below.
For the sake of comparability, our setup resembles the model of Pagano and Padilla (1997) with
the exception that we start with a symmetric distribution of information at the beginning of stage
1. As in their model, banks will end up with asymmetric information at the end of period 1. They
enjoy superior information about the past performance of their clients, which strengthens the
competitive position in period 2. This difference in detail will have far-reaching consequences for
the banking equilibrium as the next section develops in detail.
3.  Banking Equilibrium
Equilibrium is determined by backward induction. So we have to solve for the price game in
period 2 for given period 1 interest rates and given repayment probabilities of entrepreneurs, and
then determine period 1 prices. Last we characterize entrepreneurs’ investment incentives and
consequently the overall systemic default rate.
equilibrium in period 2
                                                       
5  See Result 3.2 for the precise condition.
6  See Result 3.1. for the precise condition.7
For given period interest rates  ) , ( 1 1
B A R R , in period 1 lenders will split into a clientele for bank A
and a clientele for bank B. The respective demands for loans are determined by some critical
lender )) , ( ), , (( 2 1 2 1
B B A A R R R R k k = , where k is determined by
B B A A R R k R R k 2 1 2 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( p p d p t p p d p t - + + - = - + +   .
7
Since lenders payoff functions are monotonic in distance the addresses lower than k will apply for
a loan from bank A and the addresses above k will apply for loans from B in period 1.
Accordingly, bank A has an informational monopoly for the addresses below k and bank B has an
informational monopoly above k, meaning that banks have learnt the degree of talent for each
client.
Accordingly, competition in period 2 is asymmetric. Typically, banks would compete actively,
both for known and unknown clients in stage 2. In the latter case, however, the need to worry
about the untalented clients, whom they cannot discriminate from talented ones, while their rival
can. Thus generally pricing is not trivial. However, when transportation costs are sufficiently low,
competition does not pay for the uninformed bank. In this case banks enjoy an informational
monopoly.
Result 3.1. (Informational Monopoly in Period 2)
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t  for given k, banks equilibrium price quotes are
determined by the monopolistic outcomes  ) ) 1 ( , ( ) , ( 2 2 t t k v k v R R
B A - - - = . Moreover, both banks
refrain from competing for unknown types, i.e.  ). , ( ) , ( 2 2 v v R R
B A =
￿ ￿
Proof:  see appendix.
Intuitively, in period 2 there are two effects whereby the degree of differentiation might impact
on the bank’s incentives to capture customers from those served by the rival in period 1. Firstly,
                                                       
7  Each side consists of transportation costs, period 1 costs which only arise in the case of success and period 2 costs,
which only arise after failure in period 1 and success in period 2.8
with more differentiation the rival bank will make a higher profit since it enjoys more market
power. For that reason an increased degree of differentiation will increase the incentives to
capture some fraction of the rival’s period-1 customers. Secondly, a higher degree of
differentiation in the sense of a higher transportation cost will make it harder to capture the
rival’s former cutomers, because with a higher degree of differentiation the interest rate
differential must increase to offset the increased differentiation threshold. These two effects
operate in different directions. One interpretation of Result 3.1 is that it offers a sufficient
condition, expressed in terms of the competitiveness of the lending market, for latter effect to
dominate relative to the former one.
equilibrium in period 1
Since entrepreneurs rationally anticipate period-2 prices, the critical entrepreneur can be
determined as
) (
)) 1 ( 1 ( 2 2
1
1 1







It can be seen that period-1 demand reacts more sensitively to price differentials when d
becomes large. In this case, borrowers are more concerned about future lock-in. Accordingly,
price competition in period 1 is intensified.
Banks maximize discounted expected profits which consist of period-1 profits from talented
successful entrepreneurs and of period-2 profits from talented entrepreneurs that have been
unsuccessful in period 1.
k R k v R R k G
A A ) ) ( ( ) 1 ( ) ( 0 0 1 - - - + - = t p m p d mp
) 1 )( ) ) 1 ( ( ( ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( 0 0 1 k R k v R R k G
B B - - - - - + - - = t p m p d mp
This subgame has a unique Nash-equilibrium.
                                                       
8  This follows from  ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 t p p d p t t p p d p t k v R k k v R k
B A - - - + + - = - - + + .9
Result 3.2 (Period-1 Prices)


















v  the credit market
game has a unique symmetric Nash-equilibrium in period-1 prices with









B A - - - + = =  .
Proof: see appendix.
Accordingly, equilibrium prices consist of a standard period-1 oligopoly premium, the fair cost of
funding (for uninformed lenders), and a price discount that reflects the value of the prospective
informational monopoly in period 2.
This result highlights the crucial role of future profits on market conduct in period 1. As d or v
increase, or equivalently, as period-2 profits grow, current competition intensifies and current
lending rates are dropping. If  v ) 1 ( p dp t - <  banks are even loosing money on period 1 loans.
9
Under the prospect of future informational rents they are price current loans aggressively to
compensate the period-1 losses by period-2 revenues.
It is this effect that cannot operate in the setting of Pagano and Padilla (1997), since they assume
that the condition of informational monopoly already obtains in period 1. Hence, effective
competition never takes place in the absence of information sharing in their analysis.
Despite the losses in period 1 banks will always find it profitable to lend, as the following Result
reassures.
Result 3.3 (banks’ equilibrium profits)
Equilibrium profits of the banks are given by  0
2











mpt B A G G.10
Proof: straightforward and omitted
Interestingly, equilibrium profits do not depend on v. This is the consequence of two effects that
exactly offset each other. On one hand high values of v imply high future informational rents and
on the other hand they induce high discounts in period-1 lending.
Also note that equilibrium profits are monotonically declining in d . Accordingly, banks’ profits
are largest in the absence of future competition.
entrepreneurial investment incentives
Entrepreneurs maximize expected discounted profits. Consider an entrepreneur located at
2
1
0 £ £ l .
10 In equilibrium he will belong to bank A’s clientele. So his expected payoff is
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 p t p p d p C l R v R v l U
A A - - - - + - =  .
Accordingly, his investment incentives are determined by:
0 ) ( ' ) )( 2 1 ( 2 1 = - - - - - p p d C R v R v
A A  .
Result 3.4 (entrepreneurial repayment investments)
In equilibrium repayment probabilities 
* p  of entrepreneurs are determined by the condition
) ( ' )
2






p d p d
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C v v v
R
v = - - - - + - -  .
Proof: straightforward and omitted
                                                                                                                                                                                   
9 Since in this paper we assume low values of t and high values of  v, this condition is quite likely to be met.
10  This is without loss of generality.11
4.  The Role of Information Sharing
We can now discuss the role of information sharing. We view the information sharing agreement
as a very long term decision that has to be made well before entrepreneurs’ investment decisions.
For instance, the information and communication infrastructure of credit bureaus as well as their
human capital has to be set up first. While there is some variation in the type and amount of
information communicated by credit bureaus (see e.g. Japelli, Pagano, 1999), we follow Pagano
and Padilla (1997) and assume that banks do exchange information about the borrowers types.
We shall relax this assumption in section 5. We shall also abstract from incentives issues in the
communication process and assume that the information exchanged is verifiable. Thus
information sharing renders banks’ information structures homogenous at the beginning of period
2. Competition takes place under symmetric information in both periods. Equilibrium in the
repeated credit market is readily established.
Result 4.1 (Complete Information Sharing)
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t 0
2 2 ˆ ˆ R
R R
B A + = = . Furthermore, banks’ equilibrium profits are
() ) 1 ( 1
2
ˆ ˆ p d
mt
- + = =
B A G G .
Proof: Under information sharing the banks compete in the standard Hotelling way in period 2.
This subgame is not affected by period-1 actions.  Hence, also the period-1 game is a standard
Hotelling game. ¨
An immediate implication of Result 4.1 is that equilibrium profits under information sharing
always exceed duopoly profits in the absence of information sharing.
Corollary 4.2
Under the conditions of Result 3.2, for any d , and independently of the respective repayment
probabilities p ˆ and 
* p , banks’ profits under information sharing are higher than in its absence,
i.e. B A i G G
i i , , ˆ *, = > .12
It is interesting to note that this result holds independently of entrepreneurs’ investment
incentives. In other words, even if investment incentives were not affected, information sharing
would increase overall profits. When investment incentives are affected information sharing will
tend to reduce entrepreneurs’ repayment incentives, because it raises funding costs and reduces
surplus.
Corollary 4.3
Under the conditions of Result 3.2, the repayment probabilities under information sharing are
lower than in its absence, i.e. 
* ˆ p p < .
Proof: see appendix.
Corollaries 4.2 and 4.3 reveal the collusive character of information sharing agreements in our
framework. Information sharing is a commitment not to exploit the period-2 informational
monopoly. This commitment reduces the aggressiveness of period-1 pricing and, thus, increases
overall profits for any discount factor d .
In the framework of Pagano and Padilla (1997) information sharing does not affect period-1
competition, and hence, by reducing period-2 lending rates, generates positive investment
incentives for entrepreneurs. In fact, they consider constellations with market breakdown in the
absence of information sharing. We argue that in many cases ex-ante competition may already
suffice to prevent market breakdown. In these situations information sharing may, however,
reduce the intensity of competition. In these cases information sharing agreements have a
potentially strong collusive character.
So far we followed Pagano and Padilla in our assumption that banks will communicate the true
type under information sharing, one might also consider the realistic case, when banks share less
than full information about their borrowers. This is the focus of the  next section.13
5.  Partial Information Sharing
Credit registers typically communicate black or white information only, i.e. information about
past defaults and arrears or information about the credit standing, i.e. line of credit, assets etc.
11
In our framework we cannot distinguish between default (black) information and information
about successes (white information), since the respective information partitions are perfect
complements. In each case, however, only partial information is shared, since the information
about good types that were unsuccessful in period 1 cannot be communicated.
12 Accordingly, in
the case of partial information sharing competitors remain imperfectly informed about their
rivals’ clientele.
So when banks communicate about their clients’ failures (or successes) at the end of stage 1, they
will still maintain their informational advantage about the talented but unsuccessful clients.
Accordingly, for low enough transportation costs (or product differentiation) Result 3.1 can be
invoked, which establishes conditions under which banks can maintain their informational
monopoly in period 2. Hence, in our very stylized model partial information sharing does not
affect equilibrium conduct at all.
6.  Conclusion
This paper challenges the general view in the literature about the social desirability of
information exchange among banks. We show that information exchange may reduce the
competitiveness of lending markets and, thus, provide worse repayment incentives for
entrepreneurs. The crucial difference to the existing literature is that we consider banking markets
that are initially levelled among competitors, while the existing literature concentrates on markets
with a priori heterogeneity of information that drastically affects strategic interaction. So the
existing literature concentrates on potentially positive consequences of informational exchanges
in fundamentally segmented banking markets, while we concentrate on competitive banking
markets, in which each informational advantage has to result from competitive actions. Hence, in
                                                       
11  See Japelli, Pagano (1999) for a cross-country comparison of different regimes of information sharing.14
our framework future informational rents may be a strong stimulus to current competition. This
stimulus is destroyed by information exchange.
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Appendix
Proof of Result 3.1:
In period 2 only untalented and talented but unsuccessful entrepreneurs will apply for credit. While
banks will only lend to their talented customers they do not know the types of their rival’s clients.
Hence they charge lending rates 
i R2
￿
 that reflect the risk of lending to untalented entrepreneurs.
Hence, period-2 profits consist of two elements, profits derived from lending to the known clientele
and profits that arise from lending to former customers of the rival.
Let us analyze bank A’s strategies against bank B’s clients for a given critical 
2
1
£ k . The profits
from lending to this clientele is  () 0 2 2 ) 1 ( } 0 , max{
1
) 1 (
1 R R k k G
A A A p p
mp
p m






earns profits of  () 0 2 2 ) 1 )( 1 ( R R k G
B A B - - - = p p m
￿
 since it will lend only to talented and initially
unsuccessful entrepreneurs. The critical lender 
A k
￿
 is determined by  ()
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. Otherwise bank selects a
corner solution and prefers to remain inactive in period 2. The condition for an interior solution is a
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13 competition essentially reduces
to local monopolies in period 2. Bank A’s period-2 profit function is
} ) ( , ) max{( ) 1 ( 2 2 2
A A A R R v v k v G t t p p m - - - = . Likewise, bank B’s period-2 profit function is
} ) ( , ) ) 1 ( max{( ) 1 ( 2 2 2
B B B R R v v k v G t t p p m - - - - = .
                                                       
13  Remember  2
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i i = -  it follows that bank A will select a corner solution 1 2 k v R
A t - =  when
1 2k
v
< t  and bank B will select a corner solution  ) 1 ( 1 2 k v R
B - - = t  when 
) 1 ( 2 1 k
v
-
< t .  ¨
Proof of Result 3.2:
Under conditions of period-2 monopoly (Result 3.1) and under the condition that successful
entrepreneurs generate enough cash-flow to finance period-2 investments through retained
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The critical borrower is determined by 
B B A A R R k R R k 2 2 2 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( dp p p t dp p p t - + + - = - + + ,
which in the case of period-2 monopolistic pricing implies
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= . Straightforward calculations yields Result 3.2.18
The condition on v follows directly from  1
*
1 + > R v .  In this case after repayment in period 1,
sufficient funds remain to fund the period-2 project internally.  ¨
Proof of  Corollary 4.3:
Since under the conditions of Result 3.2 market size (i.e. the mass of borrowers) is fixed,
Corollary 4.2 implies that banks capture a larger portion of the projects’ surpluses under
information sharing. Since entrepreneurial incentives are strictly monotonic in their share of the
surplus, they will invest less resources under information sharing. ¨